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Jurisdiction is conferred upon this court pursuant to Utah Code Annotated section 
78-2a-3 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1) Whether the District Court failed to review the case in its fullest considering some 
of the issues were not even discussed or answered by the respondent Board of 
Pardons (BOP) or their attorney of record These issues dealt with the BOP's 
authority and jurisdiction to act in a judicial manner 
2) Did the District Court fail to rule in favor of Stack and the twelve (12) due 
process violations he cites in his extraordinary writ with their obvious negative 
cumulative effect they had on the BOP's decision making process, and the 
subsequent 20 year re-hearing the BOP gave him based on these individual, and 
cumulative due process violations 
3) Did the District Court fail to nullify the BOP's 20 year re-hearing as it should 
have based on the prejudicial, plagiaristic, and false psychological report it used 
to base its decision on? 
4) Did the District Court deny petitioner relief of his claims in areas that the Utah 
Supreme Court has ruled in favor on in recent past cases? 
5) Did the District Court rule improperly when it dismissed the allegations of double 
jeopardy violations by the BOP. 
6) Did the District Court fail to rule in Stack's favor on his allegations and 
contentions of violations of ex post facto use of the Utah Sentence and Release 
Guidelines, subsequent revisions to it, and the modern philosophy being applied 
to his case which entails more time in prison as opposed to philosophy held in the 
1970'sera 
7) Did the District Court fail to properly review Stack's claims of unfair treatment 
compared to other prisoners who spent less than 25 years in prison for similar, 
same, or worse crimes than him; also the introduction of evidence by the BOP 
that was false and misleading to the Court and petitioner. 
8) Did the District Court err when it failed to rule in favor of and grant Stack's writ 
based on the fact that the BOP bases its decision on all information in the Board 
Packet that comes before it. Because of this fact, any, or all violations of due 
process rights protected by the Utah and U.S. Constitutions are grounds for 
granting the relief that Stack petitioned for. 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions determinative of the issues on appeal are found in the 
Utah Constitution and U.S. Constitutional law of due process, equal protection, double 
jeopardy, ex post facto, and separation of powers The Utah Sentence And Release 
Guidelines, and any revisions to them Administrative Code and Administrative Rule. 
The Laws and legal philosophy applicable in 1978, as opposed to those used in 1986 till 
present against petitioner Utah Code Ann 77-27-13, 77-27-2 (2)(d), 77-27-11 (5), 76-1-
4003, 77-27-5, 78-13-4 (2), 76-1-202, 77-1-5 The Utah Rules of Evidence 602, 603, 
701, and 806 And any others the petitioner may not be aware of, but use. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS AND 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
1) The petitioner's crime occurred on November7, 1978. 
2) On or about March 27, 1997 the petitioner Brian K. Stack caused there to be filed 
in the Third District Court of Salt Lake County a 65B Extraordinary Writ This 
action was directed at the Utah Board of Pardons and the hearing that was held on 
or about September 4, 1994. The result of this hearing was that the petitioner was 
given a re-hearing of 20 years after having served 16 years already. 
3) On or about June 14, 2000 the attorney for the BOP filed a Motion To Dismiss. 
4) On or about June 20, 2000 the petitioner caused there to filed a Response to 
Respondents Motion to Dismiss. 
3 
5) There was a hearing held on July 7, 2000 wherein the court heard arguments and 
facts from both sides of the dispute. At the conclusion of this hearing the 
Honorable Judge Young dismissed the case, but said he would make 
recommendations to the Utah Board of Pardons, those being: 
a. That a whole new psychological evaluation be done to make up for the 
prejudicial one that the BOP had used in its determination of a 20 year re-
hearing. 
b. That they give Mr. Stack a hearing long before the 2014 that is set now. 
6) An un-official, and un-signed, ORDER Dismissing Petition For Extraordinary 
Relief was made by the Assistant Attorney General dated August 2, 2000. 
7) The petitioner filed for the transcripts under indigent status trying to get the July 
7th 2000 hearing but was denied by the District Court. 
8) Petitioner filed Notice of Appeal on July 25, 2000. 
9) The petitioner has since filed for Extension of Time to file his brief waiting for 
the July 7th 2000 hearing transcripts. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS 
The petitioner contends that the District court dismissed his case without 
reviewing all of the allegations and contentions that were contained in his writ. The 
petitioner's case is also being hampered by the lack of hearing transcripts, and the 
District Court unwillingness to give them to him. The BOP failed to answer all 
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allegations and contentions made in the extraordinary writ filed against them. In fact, due 
to a recent finding in the Utah Court of Appeals that the BOP does not have the authority 
to issue arrest warrants ties in with many of the petitioners arguments contained in his 
writ. 
The cumulative effects of the due process violations that are contended by the 
petitioner should not have been dismissed. This fact is borne out in the Judges statements 
at the end of the hearing where he agreed with the fact that the use of the "psychological 
evaluation" by the BOP was wrong. That the attitudes, philosophy, and stricter standards 
used presently to deal with crime were not the same as used in 1978 when Mr. Stack's 
crime was committed, and because of this, the petitioners case should have been viewed 
in the same light as those cases in the 705s wherein prisoners were let out for committing 
same and similar crimes before a 25 year period. These constitute violations of fair 
treatment, disparity, and "equal protection". 
That the (12) allegations and contentions made by the petitioner in his writ against 
the BOP are the reasons used by them to give the petitioner a 20-year re-hearing. It is fact 
that the Board of Pardons uses all information contained in the prisoners records to base 
its decision on, not just the petitioner's institutional history as a way of explaining the 20-
year re-hearing in this case, again the cumulative due process violations. 
That the rules of evidence and testimony taking were not followed in this judicial 
setting the Utah BOP would hold as its own. 
The Utah BOP subjected the petitioner to double jeopardy. 
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The District Court accepted false and misleading information from the Board of 
Pardons in their motion to dismiss, which led to the eventual dismissal of petitioner's 
writ. 
The District Court failed to address the allegations in the writ dealing with 
documentation presented to the BOP from State agencies, on State agency letterhead, 
which lent undue prejudice to the BOP's decision making process. This violated Stack's 
due process protections. See exhibits #8. 
ARGUMENTS 
Point #1 
All of the allegations, contentions, and complaints made by Mr. Stack revolve 
around the fact that the Utah Board of Pardons (BOP) violated many of his Constitutional 
rights and guarantees involving the hearing that took place on September 16, 1994 
wherein many due process violations were violated by the BOP. 
Under the Utah Constitution, the due process clause in Article I section 7 states 
that it is "comprehensive in its application to all activities of state government." See 
Foote v. Utah Bd. Of Pardons, 808 P.2d 734, 735 (Utah 1991). What process is due in 
any given circumstance may vary, "but assuredly, the parole board is not outside the 
constitutional mandate that the actions of government must afford due process of law." 
The process due at a board of pardons hearing can only be determined "after the facts 
concerning the procedures followed by the board are flushed out." Foote, 808 P.2d at 
735. See also Neel v. Holden, 208 Utah Adv. Rep. 74 (1993). As stated in Foote at 735, 
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the Utah Constitution requires that due process protections be afforded when the BOP is 
determining the "number of years a defendant is to serve." This court has also determined 
that the BOP performs functions analogous "to that of the trial judge." See Preece v. 
House, 848 P.2d 163 (Utah Ct. App. 1993), cert. Granted 853 P.2d 89 (Utah 1993); 
Labrum v. Utah State Bd. Of Pardons, 870 P 2d 902 (Utah 1993) 
There is plenty of established procedure supporting the requirement of due 
process that Mr. Stack should have received in his 1994 hearing but did not. 
When viewed on an individual basis some of the (12) allegations of violations of 
Stack's due process rights found in sections 4 and 13 of his Amended Petition For 
Extraordinary Relief may not seem like much. Put together in their cumulative effect on 
the decision making process of the BOP they do pose a glaring violation of his due 
process rights. See specifically the psychological evaluation that was used, but was 
eventually extracted from all existing records some four (4) years after the Sept. 16, 1994 
BOP hearing. 
Point #2 
When the BOP voted to destroy all record of said psychological report on or about 
March 24, 1999 and the District Court agreed that its prejudicial nature had an effect on 
the BOP's decision-making process hence the recommendation that a new report be 
conducted by the Honorable Judge Young. All of this points to violations of due process, 
equal protection, and prejudicial acts and omissions perpetrated by the BOP. See exhibit 
#13 on record. 
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Point #3 
The findings portion of the BOP Hearing Officer (Rationale For Decision) of the 
Sept. 1994 hearing was inaccurate, false, and prejudicial. See exhibit #9. They were 
purposely skewed by the Hearing Officer to show 7 Aggravating vs. 1 Mitigating factors 
when in reality this document should have shown 5 Aggravating vs. 8 Mitigating factors 
as supported by the records in Stack's case. The District Court failed to properly 
investigate and develop these existing facts. 
Point #4 
The successive use of past disciplinary reports at three (3) different BOP hearings 
amounts to double jeopardy, see sections 2 and 3 of writ. There is support for this 
contention found in Monson v. Carver, 305 Utah Adv. Rep. 7 (1996) citing State v. 
Holland, 777 P 2d 1019, 1023 (Utah 1989); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 
717 (1969); accord State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 35 (Utah 1987) "One of the purposes 
of the prohibition against double jeopardy is to protect a defendant against the infliction 
of multiple punishments for the same offense." As the hearings before the BOP are 
judicial settings, Stack has rights to be free from double jeopardy, see United States v. 
HalEer, 490 U.S. 435(1989). 
Point #5 
Next. There is the disparity, equal protection, due process contentions and 
use of Sentence and Release Guidelines compared to other cases. This court found in 
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Labrum v. Utah State Bd, Of Pardons, 870 P 2d 902 (Utah 1993) that the BOP's use of 
Guidelines that came into effect seven (7) years after Mr Stack committed his crime, 
"have become, through policy and practice, the device for measuring "normal" terms of 
incarceration in our indeterminate sentencing scheme The Guidelines operate to promote 
uniformity in sentences, reduce the need for trials by encouraging rational plea bargains " 
The petitioner plead guilty under the assumption that he would do at most 25 years in 
prison for his guilty plea in 1979 This fact is borne out by all of the other criminal cases 
with same, similar, or worse facts and circumstances than Stack's case who were given 
parole dates before a 25 year period See listing provided in exhibit #11 and the many 
others available Stack's case is not "normal" compared to cases from the same era when 
his crime was committed 
With the majority of those similarly situated criminals who committed murder of 
officers of the law, multiple murderers, and killers who were on death row but had their 
death sentence commuted to life imprisonment all in the 1970's, we see them classified 
with Stack under the provisions of Article I section 24 of the Utah Constitution as being 
persons within a class, and that different treatment is being given to Stack compared to 
those cited cases and the many others There is no reasonable basis for the difference in 
Stack's case and those he cited in his Extraordinary Writ See State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 
261 (Utah 1986), Malan v. Lewis, 693 P 2d 661 (Utah 1984), Utah Farm Bun Ins. Co. 
v. Utah Ins. Guar. Assn., 564 P.2d 751 (Utah 1977) 
This court should compare class difference between criminals in the 
1960's and 1970" compared to criminals from 1986 till present The attitudes and 
philosophies towards crime between these two periods (tough on crime laws) must fall 
9 
into the equation of persons within a class and the statutory classifications that became 
harsher, which in turn forced the BOP to conform to new standards. 
Point #6 
The BOP violated Stack's rights by applying 1985 Sentence And Release 
Guidelines to his hearings in 1986 and 1994 in violation of ex post facto protections. See 
Garner v. Jones, 120 S. Ct. 1362 (2000); Untied States v. Swanger, U.S. Court of 
Appeals, Eighth Circuit; Akins v. Snow, 922 F.2d 1558 (11th Cir.) cert. Denied, 501 U.S. 
1260 (1991); Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37, 43 (1990). 
In Garner v. Jones the ex post facto issues mirror the instant case. When Stack 
came to prison he was able to go before the BOP every year for parole consideration. The 
law changed since Stack's crime was committed. Right now he can only come before the 
BOP every five (5) years. This change has created a significant risk that he will spend a 
longer time in prison than under the old law if still in effect. This shows a pattern of 
longer actual time served under the change in BOP rules, policy, practice, and philosophy 
after 1985. See also Fender v. Thompson, 883 F.2d 303 (4th Cir 1989); Marshall v. 
Garrison, 659 F.2d 440 (1981); U.S. v. Seacott 15 F.3d 1380 (7th Cir 1994). 
Point #7 
The BOP functions as a judicial body, Salt Lake City v. Ohms, 881 P.2d 844 
(Utah 1994). The BOP also violates the separation of powers clause of the Utah 
Constitution. Their actions are not consistent with the constitution or the questions asked 
of this court in In Re Inquiry Concerning a Judge, 361 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (1999). This 
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court need only replace the word "legislators" with "Board of Pardons Members" and all 
three "core" or "primary" functions appertaining to another branch of government are 
met. The BOP is of the Executive Branch performing Judicial Branch functions. In so 
doing they have denied Stack many of the rights afforded those before judicial bodies like 
those found in the Utah Rules of Criminal and Civil Procedures, as well as those found in 
the Rules of Evidence. Stacks due process rights were violate in this respect. 
Point #8 
The District Court should not have allowed false and misleading information to be 
introduced by the BOP. This lent undue credibility to the BOP's Motion To Dismiss, see 
exhibit #2. Stack objected to its entry but his case was dismissed anyway. 
Point #9 
There is no indication or record indicating that Stack's case was heard by the full 
BOP as is supposed to happen in all cases. He has requested documentation of this post 
hearing but the response was none existed. 
Point #10 
Stack's testimony was held in a less favorable light then that of the sister of 
Stack's victim who was sworn in at the September 16, 1994 hearing while he wasn't. 
This victim testimony was prejudicial and subjective, and it was in violation of the 
hearsay rule found in Article VIII Hearsay, Utah Rule of Evidence, it also violated 
Stack's due process protections. 
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Point #11 
False and misleading documents were entered into the record from State 
Agencies, and a State Legislator that contained hearsay and speculation at the Sept. 16, 
1994 hearing. See exhibit #8 of Amended Writ. The court never addressed these, nor did 
the respondent BOP. These allegations and contentions, as all others that went un-
answered, should prevail and this court should so state that Stack has won these issues. 
Also, that these documents be dismissed from all records. 
Point #12 
Stack was also punished for bringing a lawsuit against an employee of the Utah 
Dept. of Corrections in 1980-81 exhibit #6 of Amended Writ. This was retaliation for 
filing against and petitioning the government for wrongs committed against him. See 
Frazier v. Dubois, 922 F.2d 560, 561-62 (10th Cir 1990); Thomas v. Evans, 880 F.2d 
1235, 1241-042 (11th Cir !989); Pratt v. Rowland, 700 F.Supp. 1399, 1406 (N.D. Cal. 
1991). Stack claims violations of the ex post facto provisions also because the BOP is 
using a new law (77-27-5.3 (2)) of the Utah Code of Criminal Procedures to punish him 
for a lawsuit filed in 1980. 
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CONCLUSIONS 
That this court find all of Stack's claims and allegations have merit and are 
supported by law and past decisions of this court and others 
Based upon the foregoing arguments and law, this court should send this case 
back before the Third Judicial District Court so that the court can go over it properly with 
the full inspection and critical analysis that it has at its disposal 
That this court rule that all unanswered allegations in Stack's extraordinary writ 
be found successful in his favor, and that the BOP has lost those portions of the writ it did 
not defend against 
That this court rules the petitioner was not given a fair hearing before the BOP 
The reason the September 16, 1994 hearing was not fair is because Mr Stack was denied 
many of his due process protections at this hearing Because there was an obvious pattern 
and cumulative effect of due process violations Mr Stack requests that this court 
intervene because it is not beyond the scope of law Mr Stack asks this court to order the 
BOP to release him, or grant all of the relief asked for in his Amended Petition For 
Extraordinary Relief 
Dated th isc^^day of October 2000. 
/ 
)/XW^-t 
Brian K Stack 
Petitioner 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing appeal brief was mailed to James 
H. Beadles, Asst. Att. General, 160 E. 300 S., Salt Lake City, UT 84114 on this<^ 9 'day 
of October 2000. 
Brian K. Stack 
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